Public agronomy: Norman Borlaug as ‘brand hero’ for the Green Revolution by Sumberg, James et al.
  
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title: Public agronomy: Norman Borlaug as ‘brand hero’ for the Green Revolution 
 
Citation: Sumberg, J., D. Keeney and B. Dempsey. (2012). Public agronomy: Norman 
Borlaug as ‘brand hero’ for the Green Revolution. Journal of Development Studies 48(11): 
1587-1600. 
 
Official URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2012.713470  
More details/abstract: This paper examines the role played by Norman Borlaug in 
promoting the notion of Green Revolution as a way to rapidly transform agriculture in the 
developing world. It develops the argument that Borlaug used his profile as a ‘public 
agronomist’, gained through his successful breeding of semi-dwarf wheat varieties, to 
actively and instrumentally bolster the case for Green Revolution style agricultural 
development. In effect he played and continues to play the role of a ‘brand hero’ for the 
Green Revolution. 
Version: Submitted version (Author’s Original Manuscript) 
 
Terms of use: This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an article whose final and 
definitive form, the Version of Record, has been published in the Journal of Development 
Studies (2012) copyright Taylor & Francis, available online at: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00220388.2012.713470  
 
 
 
 
 
 
This is a download from OpenDocs at the Institute of Development Studies     
1 
 
Public agronomy: Norman Borlaug as ‘brand hero’ for the Green Revolution 
James Sumberg1, Dennis Keeney2 and Benedict Dempsey3 
 
1 Institute of Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 RE, 
UK (j.sumberg@ids.ac.uk) Corresponding author 
2 Department of Agronomy, Agronomy Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 
50011-1010, USA 
3 Save the Children UK, 1 St John's Lane, London EC1M 4AR, UK 
 
 
Pre-print version. Published as: Sumberg, J., D.  Keeney and B. Dempsey. (2012). 
Public agronomy: Norman Borlaug as ‘brand hero’ for the Green Revolution. Journal 
of Development Studies 48(11): 1587-1600. 
 
  
2 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the role played by Norman Borlaug in promoting the notion of 
Green Revolution as a way to rapidly transform agriculture in the developing world. It 
develops the argument that Borlaug used his profile as a ‘public agronomist’, gained 
through his successful breeding of semi-dwarf wheat varieties, to actively and 
instrumentally bolster the case for Green Revolution style agricultural development. 
In effect he played and continues to play the role of a ‘brand hero’ for the Green 
Revolution. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Agronomy is the application of the plant and soil sciences to crop production. For the 
most part both applied and research-oriented agronomists labour outside the public 
gaze despite the fact their work underpins the vital relationship between people and 
food, and their proximity to important contemporary and highly contested debates 
around climate change, food security, food prices, food safety, biofuels and land 
grabs. 
A list of modern agronomists who have gained even a modicum of recognition 
beyond the agricultural research and farming communities would be short, and would 
include the likes of René Dumont and M. S. Swaminathan. But perhaps the best 
example of a modern agronomist who operated within the public sphere is Norman 
Borlaug, wheat breeder, ‘hunger fighter’, ‘father of the Green Revolution’, Nobel 
Peace Prize laureate and tireless campaigner for the transformation of agriculture in 
the developing world. 
This paper is about the development of Norman Borlaug as a ‘public 
agronomist’ and how he subsequently used his public profile to promote a particular 
vision of agricultural development. The argument we develop is that Borlaug’s public 
profile and credibility were (and continues to be, even after his death) actively and 
instrumentally used to bolster the case for Green Revolution. In effect, he played and 
continues to play the role of a ‘brand hero’ for the Green Revolution approach. In 
making this argument we draw on ideas from two areas of scholarship. The first 
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focuses on the role, use and power of framing and narrative in policy processes, while 
the second is concerned with the creation, management and marketing of brands, and 
particularly the roles of celebrity endorsement and brand heroes in these processes. 
It is not our purpose to (1) rehearse the now well known arguments around the 
various benefits and cost associated with the Green Revolution of the 1960s and 
1970s; denigrate or diminish – explicitly or implicitly – the pivotal  role that Borlaug 
played in it; or engage directly with on-going debates around the benefits or otherwise 
of transgenic crops to smallholder farmers. Rather our purpose is to shed new light on 
the dynamics of Borlaug’s transition from wheat breeder to public agronomist, and the 
ways he then used this new role to actively promote a particular model of agricultural 
development.  
We use the term Green Revolution to refer to an approach to agricultural 
development that sought and continues to seek to rapidly maximise land productivity 
through the use of modern agricultural technology including genetically superior crop 
varieties, fertiliser and pesticide.  In addition to technology and associated inputs, the 
success of the Green Revolution approach was and continues to be dependent on the 
availability of credit, infrastructure and a supportive policy environment. The 
experience with wheat and rice in countries including Mexico, India, Pakistan and the 
Philippines from the mid-1950s through the 1970s defined both the potential and the 
challenges associated with the Green Revolution. Gaud (1968) is usually cited as the 
originator of the term. In this paper we distinguish between the Green Revolution 
approach and some other alternative approaches to agricultural development primarily 
by the importance that the alternatives attach to a ‘sustainability rider’ on the yield 
maximisation objective.  
The remainder of this paper is organised in four parts. In the next section we 
present a conceptual framework that draws on ideas around framing, narratives, brand 
community, celebrity endorsement and brand heroes. Following this we trace Norman 
Borlaug’s development as a public agronomist through the success of his wheat 
breeding activities and the spread of the resulting varieties from Mexico into Asia. 
Here we also analyse his involvement in the Sasakawa Global 2000 initiative to ‘bring 
the Green Revolution to Africa’. In the section that follows we develop the argument 
that during the last 30 years of his life Borlaug essentially functioned as a brand hero 
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for the idea of Green Revolution. In the last section we discuss the implications of this 
analysis. 
 
FRAMING, NARRATIVE, BRANDS AND HEROES 
 
Policy advocates use a variety of different strategies and tactics in order to reinforce 
or change attitudes to problems or particular policy options held by policy makers, 
other policy advocates, opinion formers or members of the general public. One of 
these ‘weapon[s] of advocacy and consensus’ (Weiss 1989, p.117) is framing, ‘the 
process of selecting, emphasizing, and organizing aspects of complex issues, 
according to overriding evaluative or analytical criterion’ (Daviter 2007, p.654). 
Another is narrative (Keeley & Scoones 2003, Roe 1991). 
The basic observation that underpins the interest in framing is that in some 
situations small changes ‘in the presentation of an issue or an event produce 
(sometimes large) changes of opinion’ (Chong & Druckman 2007, p.104). This is 
referred to as the ‘framing effect’. While much of the research literature focuses on 
the effects of framing by elites (e.g. politicians) on public opinion, the same dynamic 
plays-out among elites, within policy communities and so on. Chong and Druckman 
(2007, p.111) suggest that framing can work at three levels: ‘making new beliefs 
available about an issue, making certain available beliefs accessible, or making beliefs 
applicable or “strong” in people’s evaluations’. Framing is best conceptualised as a 
process that evolves over time (Chong & Druckman 2007). It is a political act which, 
if successful, carries with it the ability ‘to influence ensuing policy dynamics over the 
long run to the extent that the specific representation and delineation of policy issues 
shapes the formation of substantive interests and at times restructures constituencies’ 
(Daviter 2007, p.655). In other words, rather than being an antecedent of action, 
framing is ‘at the heart of the action itself’ (Weiss 1989, p.98).  
The role of narratives in development policy, and in policy processes more 
generally, is now widely recognised (Roe 1991). A policy narrative is a story that 
provides a simple and accessible explanation of a complex situation. As such, a 
narrative highlights a specific problem and then identifies its cause and a preferred 
policy response. Policy narratives use stylised facts in an effort to galvanise and 
engender action: they are not encumbered by theory, details, caveats, uncertainty or 
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the often inconvenient truths of site and context specificity. Some narratives are 
surprisingly resilient and long-lived despite the undermining of their key elements by 
empirical research and bitter experience, and the emergence of equally plausible 
counter narratives. Framing and narrative work hand-in-hand to cut through the 
disorder and complexity of the real world. Policy advocates use competing narratives, 
framed in particular ways, to push policy processes toward their favoured responses 
and outcomes. 
The literature on framing and narrative within policy processes is not often 
brought together with the extensive literature on brands and brand management that is 
associated with business studies, marketing and cultural studies. Nevertheless we 
suggest there are strong links between the dynamics of framing and narratives in 
policy processes and those of branding and marketing. A brand is a device that is used 
to differentiate one product, service, organisation or idea from another. According to 
Kay (2006) ‘the function of a brand is to create meaning’ which is done through a 
name and the use of selected symbols, slogans and associations. In creating, building 
and managing a successful brand these elements coalesce into a narrative or story that 
prompts action and loyalty (i.e. continued action) amongst a target group.  
Given its economic importance and financial implications it is not surprising 
that the literature around branding is both rich and plentiful (Keller & Lehmann 
2006). Here, with our focus on the Green Revolution and Norman Borlaug, we 
highlight only the notions of brand community, celebrity endorsement and brand hero. 
The basic argument is that we can understand the continued promotion of the Green 
Revolution in response to food insecurity and rural poverty (‘hunger’), as an exercise 
in creating and building a brand. Differentiation is fundamental to the notion of brand. 
So, if ‘agricultural development’ is a generic or undifferentiated product, then Green 
Revolution represents a specific type of or approach to agricultural development. As 
such it is differentiated from both the generic form and from other approaches such as 
organic farming, low-external input agriculture, sustainable agriculture, agro-ecology, 
food sovereignty or ‘sustainable intensification’ (some of which developed in 
response to and all of which are promoted as alternatives to Green Revolution). This 
differentiation works first and foremost through the world-wide recognition of the 
name Green Revolution. Like all successful brands the Green Revolution has spawned 
imitators including the White Revolution, referring to small-scale milk production in 
6 
 
India (Bellur et al. 1990, Parthasarathy 1991); the Blue Revolution, referring to 
aquaculture (Coull 1993); the Maize Revolution, referring to small-holder maize 
production in Africa (Byerlee & Eicher 1997); the Evergreen Revolution, referring to 
the idea that it is possible to use technology to increase productivity in perpetuity 
without ecological harm (Swaminathan 2004); and the Doubly Green Revolution, 
referring to the necessity of integrating environmental conservation with agricultural 
productivity enhancement (Conway 1999). 
The meaning that is associated with the Green Revolution brand is 
fundamentally about the need to rapidly increase crop productivity in order to feed 
hungry people. Looked at another way, the Green Revolution brand is framed by the 
poverty, hunger and famine that characterised the post-war period in Asia and some 
other parts of the developing world. It relies on a simple narrative to ‘create meaning’ 
and prompt action. This narrative suggests that as was so dramatically demonstrated 
for wheat and rice during the period 1944 – 1970, modern agricultural technology 
(principally high yielding varieties combined with appropriate management, fertiliser, 
pesticides, irrigation, credit and reasonable farm-gate prices), developed through 
focused scientific research, can significantly increase the productivity of staple crops 
on small farms in the developing world. Modern agricultural technology to maximise 
crop yield is thus the essential weapon in the battle against food insecurity, hunger 
and starvation (and the likelihood of social unrest).  
In addition to the brand name, a number of other associations and images help 
to power this narrative. These include the references to famine, starvation and the 
Malthusian dilemma, which reinforce the impression that the problem is both severe 
and urgent. The use of military references – including weapons, fight, struggle and 
battle – provides a sharp moral or crusading edge to ‘humanitarian’ interventions. The 
military imagery also opens a place for key individuals whose leadership, vision and 
dedication can drive the troops forward into battle. 
We argue that conceiving of the Green Revolution as a brand, supported by an 
internationally recognised name and a compelling narrative, is justified because as 
with any brand, the objective is to increase awareness and build or strengthen support 
for specific actions. While with consumer brands (e.g. Coke, Nike and Apple) the 
action of interest is primarily the purchase of the branded product, in the case of the 
Green Revolution the desired actions are increased support for yield maximising 
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agricultural research and commitment to the resulting set of crop production 
technologies. Here ‘brand loyalty’ translates into consistent, long-term support for the 
Green Revolution approach to agricultural development. 
In making this argument we draw on the concept of brand community, which 
Muniz and O’Guinn (2001, p.412) define as ‘a specialised, non-geographically bound 
community, based on a structured set of social relations among admirers of a brand’ 
(also see McAlexander et al. 2002). The central idea here is that there is much more 
than a simple, isolated, one-way relationship between a brand and a consumer. Rather, 
members of a brand community are actively involved in the brand’s construction and 
promotion. In effect, depending on the nature of the product, brand and so on, brands 
are co-constructed and co-promoted through the brand community. For the Green 
Revolution brand of agricultural development the contemporary brand community 
might be considered to include bi-lateral funders (USAID, DFID, JICA…), national 
and international agricultural research organisations and initiatives, The Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the Ford, Rockefeller and Gates Foundations, 
companies supplying agricultural inputs (including seeds, fertiliser, pesticides and 
machinery) and agricultural policy makers at all levels. 
The value of celebrity endorsement in brand creation and management has 
long been recognised (McCracken 1989). The association of a celebrity with a brand 
helps to create the meaning that makes the brand a compelling proposition. The 
attractiveness and credibility of the endorser are two characteristics that have been 
central to research on celebrity endorsement. However, McCracken (1989, p.301) 
suggests that this approach is not sufficient for analysing the dynamics of celebrity 
endorsement because endorsement is a cultural process that ‘consists in the transfer of 
these meanings from the celebrity to the product, and from the product to the 
consumer’. Celebrity endorsement is central not only to the marketing of consumer 
brands, but also to the marketing or promotion of more abstract ideas and causes. For 
example, in the fields of environment and development, Brockington (2008) explores 
the role of ‘celebrity conservationists’ in promoting what he argues are ‘powerful’ but 
‘ungrounded’ environmentalisms; Goodman (2010) analyses how celebrities have 
been used to embody the mainstreaming of Fairtrade as quality products in the UK; 
and Goodman and Barnes (2010) look at the roles of celebrities in promoting 
international development more broadly (also see, Richey & Ponte 2011). 
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A recent refinement in the literature on celebrity endorsement is the notion of 
the brand hero. While a celebrity endorsement works because of the associations the 
target audience makes with the celebrity, brand heroes ‘derive[s] their perceived 
expertise from their involvement in the creation or production of the brand’ (Eagar 
2009). Brand heroes are internally generated celebrities ‘who are recognised by the 
brand community for their role within the brand’s creation’ (Eagar 2009). In contrast 
to celebrity endorsers, the credibility of brand heroes comes from their role in 
establishing or maintaining brand values, and their concern, as a member of the brand 
community, with the brand's success. So, while a footballer might provide a celebrity 
endorsement for a particular brand of potato crisps, the relationship of Steve Jobs to 
the Apple brand is closer to that of a brand hero (i.e. he was intimately involved with 
the creation of the brand and the maintenance of Apple’s values). In this sense a brand 
hero can be seen as a further development of Brockington’s ‘celebrity 
conservationists’ who ‘win fame from their conservation activities’ (Brockington 
2009, p.62-63), the distinction being that not all celebrity conservationists are 
associated with what could be construed as a particular ‘brand’ of conservation. Eagar 
(2008) highlights the importance of the mythology surrounding brand heroes, a point 
we return to later. 
The argument that we develop in the remainder of the paper is that Norman 
Borlaug meets the criteria of and functioned as a brand hero. His public recognition 
(starting with the award of the Nobel Peace prize in 1970) and his recognition by and 
credibility within the brand community were all tied directly to his success as a 
breeder of rust-resistant and then high yielding, semi-dwarf wheat. This success was 
critical for the eventual creation and continuing promotion of the Green Revolution 
brand.  
 
THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC AGRONOMIST 
 
Borlaug’s life and career are very well documented (Bickel 1974, Hesser 2006, Quinn 
2008, Swanson 2009, Vietmeyer 2009a, Vietmeyer 2009b, Vietmeyer 2009c, 
Vietmeyer 2011) (also see Table 1). In order to explain what are portrayed as his 
defining traits – single-mindedness and a strong work ethic – these accounts 
invariably highlight his humble roots in rural Iowa and the formative role of family, 
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farm life and competitive sports. They are also unanimous in suggesting that his 
encounter with Depression-era urban poverty as a university student resulted in a life-
long commitment to the alleviation of hunger and poverty. Following Eagar these 
aspects of Borlaug’s life might be considered part of a ‘creator myth’. The point here 
is not to question the veracity or importance of these events, but rather to recognise 
their role, because ‘the myth of the brand hero prior to the brand’s creation still 
reflecting the brand’s values is important to the brand community’ (Eagar 2008). 
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Table 1. Borlaug timeline. 
1914 Born, northern Iowa 
1937 Marries 
 Awarded BS degree in forestry, University of Minnesota 
1941 Accepts job with E. I. DuPont Nemours & Company 
1942 Awarded PhD in plant pathology & genetics, University of Minnesota 
1944  Goes to Mexico to work within the Cooperative Wheat Research and Production 
Program of the Office of Special Studies, a joint government of Mexico and the 
Rockefeller Foundation 
1946 Develops ‘shuttle breeding’ technique 
[1962 Release of first semi-dwarf wheat variety in Mexico] 
1966  Named Director of the International Wheat Improvement Programme at the newly 
formed International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) 
[1968 Pakistan declared self-sufficient in food production] 
1968  Awarded First International Service Award in Agronomy by American Society of 
Agronomy (ASA) 
1970 Awarded Nobel Peace Prize 
[1974  India declared self-sufficient in food production] 
1977 Awarded President’s Medal of Freedom 
1978 Member, Presidential Commission on World Hunger 
1979 Ends full-time employment with CIMMYT 
1984 Joins Texas A&M University as professor 
1985  Helps establish Sasakawa-Global 2000; served as President until his death 
1986 Played major role in establishment of World Food Prize 
1990 Member, Presidential Commission on Science and Technology 
1996  World Food Prize Laureate   
1999 Named by Time Magazine as ‘one of 100 most influential minds of the 20th century’ 
2000 Awarded Vannevar Bush Award for lifetime achievement in science 
2002 Awarded Public Welfare Medal of the National Academy of Sciences 
2005 Founds Borlaug Global Rust Initiative (with FAO) 
2007 Awarded honorary doctorate from Texas A&M University 
 Awarded Congressional Gold Medal 
2009 Died of cancer in Dallas, Texas 
NB: The entries in this table are meant to be illustrative as opposed to exhaustive.  
 
We pick up the story in 1944 when, following a PhD in plant pathology at the 
University of Minnesota and two years of employment at the chemical company 
DuPont Nemours, Borlaug joined the Office of Special Studies (OSS), a newly 
established collaborative programme between the Mexican government and the 
Rockefeller Foundation. This programme, developed following a suggestion from 
incoming US Secretary of Agriculture (Orville Freeman) to the Rockefeller 
Foundation, had the objective bringing modern science to bear on Mexico’s low 
productivity agricultural sector and the poverty, chronic hunger and social instability 
associated with it. 
Borlaug’s work within the OSS involved the establishment and management 
of a large-scale wheat breeding programme with an initial focus on resistance to the 
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disease stem rust (Puccinia graminis). The innovative elements of this programme 
included the very large number of crosses that were made and the use of ‘shuttle 
breeding’ which resulted in more rapid genetic progress by allowing two selection 
cycles per year (Borlaug 1953). Shuttle breeding also helped identify genetic material 
that displayed wide environmental adaptation. 
The programme also introduced the dwarfing genes, which Japanese breeders 
had worked with in the 1930s, into its spring wheat germplasm. Eight years after the 
initial crosses the first rust resistant semi-dwarf varieties were made available to 
farmers in Mexico in 1962 (Ortiz et al. 2007). The great advantage of the short stature 
varieties was that they were less likely to lodge (fall over) with the application of 
nitrogen fertiliser, and were more efficient in converting fertiliser nutrients into 
additional grain. They thus represented a significant opportunity for productivity 
enhancement. Shorter wheat and rice varieties combined with fertiliser and good 
overall agronomy were to become a cornerstone of the early Green Revolution in both 
Latin America and Asia.  
Even before the semi-dwarf ‘Mexican wheats’ really made their mark in India 
and Pakistan, the OSS experience served as a catalyst for the establishment of the 
International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines in 1960, which was 
followed in 1966 by the International Centre for Maize and Wheat Improvement 
(CIMMYT) in Mexico. These were the first of what was to become a global network 
of (presently 15) agricultural centres that in 1970 were brought together under the 
umbrella of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).  
Borlaug served as the Director of CIMMYT’s International Wheat Improvement 
Programme from 1966 until 1979, and was a consultant to CIMMYT for many years 
thereafter. 
There can be no questioning the fact that the OSS, Borlaug and eventually 
CIMMYT were at the epicentre of developments of global significance. The rust-
resistant semi-dwarf wheat varieties from the OSS programme were widely used in 
breeding programmes and relatively quickly, semi-dwarf, broadly adapted and high 
yielding wheat and rice varieties came to dominate key production areas in Latin 
America and Asia. Combined with investments in extension, fertiliser and 
infrastructure development, this shift resulted in dramatic increases in farm-level 
productivity and aggregate food production. While many different individual 
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researchers, institutes, government departments and officials were involved in the 
development and promotion of these varieties and their associated management 
systems, they were all influenced to a greater or lesser degree by Borlaug and the OSS 
wheat experience. The training, capacity-building and international outreach activities 
undertaken by OSS and later CIMMYT were extremely important channels for this 
influence. 
By the time he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1970 Borlaug was 
already well known in US and international agriculture circles. The fact of being the 
first agricultural scientist to be recognised by the Nobel Committee inevitably raised 
his public profile as did the many honours and awards that followed. He soon grew 
into the role of a public agronomist and in so doing showed no inclination to shy away 
from contentious issues. For example, he introduced a 1972 article in Bioscience in 
which he argued against restricting the use of DDT and other pesticides as follows: 
 
The current vicious, hysterical propaganda campaign against the use of 
agricultural chemicals, being promoted today by fear provoking, irresponsible 
environmentalists, had its genesis in the best selling ‘half-science-half-fiction 
novel’ Silent Spring, published in 1962. This poignant, powerful, book – 
written by the talented scientist Rachel Carson - sowed the seeds for the 
propaganda whirlwind and the press, radio and television circuses that are 
being sponsored in the name of conservation today, but which are to the 
detriment of world society, by the various organizations making up the 
environmentalist movement. (Borlaug 1972a, p.41) 
 
This and other publications along similar lines (Borlaug 1971a, Borlaug 1972b, 
Borlaug 1974) provoked considerable controversy (Bennett 1972, Hendrix 1972, 
Krebs 1972, Peakall 1972, Philogen 1972, Robinson 1972), and illustrate Borlaug’s 
willingness to operate outside the traditional comfort zone of agronomists. Another 
example of his readiness to publicly promote his deeply held beliefs, even at the cost 
of controversy, is his oft-repeated suggestion that the enhancement of agricultural 
productivity on good quality land should be seen as a land and nature conservation 
strategy in that it reduces the pressure on forest and marginal lands (Borlaug 1972a, 
Borlaug 2007). This has been called by some the ‘Borlaug Hypothesis’ (Angelsen & 
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Kaimowitz 2001, Pearce 2011), and opened Borlaug to the charge of being an 
apologist for industrial agriculture and corporate agri-business interests (Mwale 
2006).  
Neither Borlaug nor those who so actively lionized him (and continue to do 
so) would countenance any questioning or critique of the Green Revolution. Those 
who raised early concerns about the Green Revolution’s methods or social, economic 
or environmental impacts (e.g. Cleaver 1972, and many others, Frankel 1971, 
Ladejinsky 1970, Paddock 1970), were ignored, brushed-off or (as in the DDT 
example above) ridiculed. Critics were labeled as ‘environmentalists’, ‘academics’, 
‘bureaucrats’ or ‘defeatists’ who, it was suggested, had never experienced hunger or 
worked a day in the fields with poor farmers. From Borlaug’s perspective there could 
be no doubt about the fact that everyone gained from higher yields increased food 
availability. Without judging the merits of the various critiques of the Green 
Revolution, we might see Borlaug’s reaction as a deliberate strategy of closing down 
discussion of alternative pathways and analyses (Leach et al. 2010). It is of course 
important to remember that policy advocates of all persuasions – including those 
promoting alternatives to the Green Revolution approach – actively use framing and 
narratives, and also attempt to close down consideration of the alternatives they do not 
prefer.   
 
Bringing the Green Revolution to Africa 
 
A significant step in Borlaug’s development as a public agronomist was his 
involvement in a high-profile initiative to ‘bring the Green Revolution to Africa’. This 
episode illustrates not only his growing public profile, but also how the treatment of 
information about the Green Revolution has been influenced by Borlaug’s public 
image and reputation. 
By the mid-1980s Western public awareness of food insecurity in sub-Saharan 
Africa was high following media coverage of famine in Ethiopia in 1984 (Brinkley 
1996). At this point Borlaug was ‘settling into the role of senior statesman in the 
world food community’ (Hesser 2006) and was actively engaged in debates far 
beyond the realm of wheat breeding. In 1984, Borlaug was approached by Japanese 
billionaire Ryoichi Sasakawa, who offered to fund initiatives to bring the Green 
14 
 
Revolution to Africa (Brinkley 1996, Hesser 2006). Borlaug reluctantly agreed to 
organise a conference in Geneva on the subject, and subsequently to lead several pilot 
projects in African countries funded by Sasakawa’s Japan Shipbuilding Industry 
Foundation. Ryoichi Sasakawa then entered into partnership with former US president 
Jimmy Carter and his organisation Global 2000 (that had the explicit intention of 
‘transform[ing] sub-Saharan Africa from an agricultural wasteland to a thriving 
breadbasket’ (Brinkley 1996, p.54)). Together, they formed the organisation 
Sasakawa-Global 2000 (SG2000). 
Under Borlaug’s technical leadership, SG2000 began ‘dynamic field testing 
and demonstration programmes’, promoting new maize and sorghum seed, fertiliser 
and other technology (Borlaug & Dowswell 1995, Ortiz et al. 2007). The first two 
countries to host trials were Ghana and Sudan, with Ghana being chosen because of 
its manageable size, climate, abundant minerals and political support. Sudan in 
contrast was not seen by Borlaug as a good candidate as it suffered from droughts, 
parasitic diseases and ongoing conflict. Carter however, explicitly pushed for Sudan 
to be included precisely because the challenges were so great; by working in Sudan he 
hoped to use ‘agricultural diplomacy’ to address the country’s political challenges 
(Brinkley 1996). 
SG2000 provided credit so farmers could use the new technology on relatively 
large ‘production test plots’ (PTPs). Some years later it was reported that ‘Virtually 
without exception, the PTP yields obtained by the participating farmers are two to 
three times higher – and occasionally four times higher –  than the control plots 
employing traditional methods. Only rarely has the PTP plot yield failed to double 
that of the control’ (Borlaug & Dowswell 1995, p.121). In Ghana, using new cultivars 
resistant to maize streak virus, SG2000’s programme expanded from 40 plots in 1986 
to 80,000 in 1989 (Hesser 2006), and national maize production was said to have 
increased by almost 50% within three years (Ortiz et al. 2007). In Sudan, initial plans 
to work in rain-fed areas were abandoned owing to security concerns, and the project 
focused instead on irrigated wheat production. By combining a new Indian heat-
resistant variety with fertiliser, they demonstrated that significant increases in yield 
could be obtained. During the first three years of SG2000’s operations in Sudan wheat 
production was reported to have increased from 150,000 tonnes to over 750,000 
tonnes (Brinkley 1996, Ortiz et al. 2007). A central element of SG2000’s projects was 
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the use of Quality Protein Maize (QPM) cultivars (Quinn 2008). Grain of these 
cultivars, based on the natural opaque-2 mutant, contain twice as much of the essential 
amino acids lysine and tryptophan as conventional maize, and it was hoped that they 
could help to reduce malnutrition in areas with high levels of protein deficiency. In 
the early 1990s, SG2000 introduced into Ghana a variety of QPM they named 
Obatanpa meaning ‘good nursing mother’ in Ashanti.  
The initial results of SG2000’s projects in Ghana and Sudan caused great 
excitement, and led to the establishment of projects in a further 13 African countries 
including Ethiopia, Tanzania, Benin, Togo and Nigeria. SG2000’s work brought 
claims that the Green Revolution was finally coming to Africa (Ortiz et al. 2007). 
Brinkley (1996) hails the results in Ghana as a ‘stunning success’, while Hesser 
(2006) reports that because of the success of SG2000 Borlaug became a household 
name and a ‘hero’ in parts of Africa. Despite such acclaim, however, the record of 
SG2000 is ambiguous. According to Ortiz et al. (2007), drought and a lack of 
infrastructure significantly undermined the SG2000 intensive production model. In 
some cases, the initial increases in production were followed by a collapse in grain 
prices, leaving farmers unable to repay their loans and production increases were not 
sustained once SG2000 had withdrawn its support (Ortiz et al. 2007).  
The SG2000 experience was interpreted in a variety of ways. Borlaug was 
encouraged by the fact that African farmers ‘want access to technologies that can 
reduce the drudgery of agriculture and dramatically improve crop productivity and 
income’ (Borlaug & Dowswell 1995, p.128) but saw numerous hurdles including a 
lack of infrastructure, the need for public sector reform and the attitudes of Western 
environmentalists and ‘some sociologist-anthropologists, economists and other 
agricultural professionals’ who denied the need for fertiliser and other modern inputs 
and romanticised traditional farming practices (Borlaug & Dowswell 1995, cf. 
Farrington 1995). Carter is reported as saying ‘if they can stop killing each other 
Sudan could once again be the breadbasket of Africa’ (Brinkley, 1996: 62). Limited 
investment in agriculture and lack of ‘political will’ were invoked to explain the 
disappointment around SG2000. Despite the failure of SG2000 to instigate an ‘Asian-
style’ Green Revolution in Africa, those promoting the idea today draw 
encouragement from the SG2000 experience and Borlaug’s contribution to it: 
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Chissano (2010) for example portrays it as vital groundwork for a revolution that is 
yet to take place. 
SG2000 gained a lot from its association with Borlaug and there is little doubt 
that Borlaug’s involvement with SG2000 further enhanced his reputation as a global 
humanitarian. The back cover of his authorised biography carries a quotation from 
former US president George H. W. Bush, stating: ‘I have been particularly impressed 
by his work in Africa… Dr Borlaug is an American hero and a world icon’ (Hesser, 
2006). Along similar lines, Dr Akinwumi Adesina, Vice President of the Alliance for 
a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), hails Borlaug for: 
 
‘…sow[ing] the seeds for change here in Africa. He was a great champion of 
this continent not just through the contributions of his scientific knowledge of 
agriculture but also through his unwavering belief that Africa could, with the 
right strategies and focused investment and commitment from governments 
here and abroad, feed itself’ (Adesina 2010). 
 
Borlaug’s engagement with SG2000 illustrates further his willingness to move beyond 
the narrow confines of plant breeding. It also shows that he was beginning to be used 
by others for the delivery of larger political objectives. Carter’s intentions, as 
illustrated by his choice of Sudan as a trial country, were primarily political – to 
enhance peace through agricultural production. The association with Borlaug brought 
another ‘heavy hitter’ to this cause (Brinkley 1996, p.54). 
 
BORLAUG AS BRAND HERO 
 
The brand hero is the central figure within a brand community. While most of the 
literature dealing with brand communities relates to consumer brands (McAlexander 
et al. 2002, Muniz & O’Guinn 2001, Stokburger-Sauer 2010), here we focus on the 
community of individuals and organisations who believe in and promote the Green 
Revolution approach to agricultural development. This community is not 
geographically bound, but it is characterised by ‘structured social relations’ (e.g. 
between policy makers, funders, researchers and the media), and thus fits the 
conception of brand community developed by Muniz and O’Guinn (2001). While 
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none of the members of this community would necessarily consider the Green 
Revolution as a ‘brand’ or see themselves as part of a brand community, they 
nevertheless share a deeply-held commitment to the Green Revolution approach to 
agricultural transformation as a key hunger and poverty reduction strategy in rural 
areas.  
We argue that among the members of this community Borlaug played (and 
posthumously continues to play) the role of brand hero, i.e. an individual whose 
credibility derives from his intimate involvement in the creation of the brand and who 
embodies brand values (Eagar 2009). The hero status of Borlaug is evident in the 
labels and claims that are commonly associated with him: ‘father of the Green 
Revolution’ (Tomar 2009); ‘the man who fed the world’ (Hesser 2006); ‘the man who 
saved more people than anyone else in history’ (McGovern 2010); ‘the man who 
saved a billion lives’2; and ‘the man who proved Malthus wrong’ (Guillebaud & 
Hayes 2008, Tuns 2009). His status amongst the members of the Green Revolution 
brand community is amply demonstrated by the many honorary degrees and other 
awards he was given and the tone of the numerous obituaries and reminiscences that 
marked his passing (e.g. Bagla 2009, Iwanaga 2009, Khush 2009, Palagyi 2009, 
Rajaram 2011, Swaminathan 2009). 
During the three decades between his retirement from full time employment at 
CIMMYT and his death in 2009, Borlaug never stopped promoting the idea of the 
Green Revolution. We reviewed above his involvement in and guidance of the 
SG2000 initiative. Beyond this he repeatedly used high impact scientific journals to 
make the case for Green Revolution, as illustrated by a series of articles published in 
Science. In 1983 he reviewed the contribution of conventional plant breeding in 
increasing grain productivity, and argued for continued investment in these methods 
since ‘they represent the major line of defence today on the food front’ (Borlaug 1983, 
p.693). In a letter to Science in 2004 he cited the fact that plant breeding research at 
CGIAR centres had declined 6.5 per cent per year for a decade as evidence that the 
CGIAR had ‘lost touch with its original purpose—to feed the hungry’. Here he argued 
for a renewed focus on the system’s comparative advantage, namely ‘developing 
improved food crop varieties, using a combination of conventional plant breeding 
techniques and new techniques of biotechnology, with complementary crop 
management practices, to address major production issues in both the favored and the 
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more difficult marginal lands’ (Borlaug 2004b). In a 2007 editorial piece in Science 
he again argued for a commitment to research-driven agricultural development by 
highlighting the productivity gains achieved since the 1950s and then returned to one 
of his favourite themes, the links between population growth, food production and 
environmental sustainability (Borlaug 2007).3 
If key elements of his vision for the Green Revolution remained constant over 
this period – including productive crop varieties, increased fertiliser use, investment in 
research and infrastructure – Borlaug’s vision was not static. This is illustrated by his 
changing attitude toward biotechnology and genetic engineering. In his 1983 review 
of conventional plant breeding published in Science he acknowledged there were 
‘potentially great payoffs’ to genetic engineering but argued that there was as yet ‘no 
firm evidence’ that the progress seen in work with bacteria and yeast could be 
repeated in higher plants. In any case, he argued that there was no basis on which to 
assume that pest resistance developed through genetic engineering would be more 
durable than that developed through conventional techniques. In sum, while genetic 
engineering warranted some investment, conventional plant breeding should remain 
the mainstay of crop improvement (Borlaug 1983). Over the next twenty years, as the 
field developed, he became more enthusiastic about biotechnology and transgenic 
varieties, citing the potential to reduce pesticide application and to identify “‘master 
genes’ for high yield potential by eliminating the confounding effects of other genes” 
(Borlaug 2002). Now he argued for the CGIAR to return to its original focus on crop 
improvement ‘using a combination of conventional plant breeding techniques and 
new techniques of biotechnology’ (Borlaug 2004b) . He also warned about the 
potential spilling over of negative attitudes toward transgenic crops from the 
developed to the developing countries.  
But his attitude was hardening and the tendency to ridicule opposing views is 
again evident in the forward he contributed to The Frankenfood Myth: How Protest 
and Politics Threaten the Biotech Revolution (Miller & Conko 2004). Here he 
described the refusal of some southern African countries to accept US food aid 
composed of transgenic Bt maize as ‘an obscene exaggeration of risk’ (for an 
alternative perspective see, Bohannon 2002, Mwale 2006), and the resistance to 
transgenic crops more generally as ‘yet another sordid episode in this larger anti-
technology, junk-science movement’ (Borlaug 2004a). By 2007, taking into account 
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both the growing experience with transgenic crops and the projected effects of climate 
change, he had reservations about the future role of biotechnology: ‘Genetically 
engineered crops are playing an increasingly important role in world agriculture, 
enabling scientists to reach across genera for useful genes to enhance tolerance to 
drought, heat, cold, and waterlogging, all likely consequences of global warming. I 
believe biotechnology will be essential to meeting future food, feed, fiber, and biofuel 
demand’ (Borlaug 2007, emphasis added) 
Borlaug’s embrace of biotechnology and transgenic crops was associated with 
an increasingly close relationship with the biotechnology industry. Since 1990 he had 
been the ‘first founding patron’ of the International Service for the Acquisition of 
Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA), a not-for-profit organisation whose donors 
include a number of prominent biotechnology, seed and agribusiness corporations. 
Borlaug’s position on biotechnology encapsulated in the 2007 quote above, allowed 
ISAAA and others associated with the industry to blur the boundaries between the 
past gains from the Green Revolution (achieved without biotechnology or transgenics) 
and their claims regarding the future potential of transgenic varieties to enhance the 
productivity (and the livelihoods) of small farmers in the developing world (e.g. 
Anonymous 2009, Beachy 2010, cf. Glover 2010, Herring 2007, Lipton 2007). In 
other words, taking the lead from Borlaug himself, supporters of biotechnology have 
appropriated (and continue to appropriate) his status as brand hero in order to bridge 
the gap between (his) past achievements and (their) future promises, for the purpose 
of strengthening the case for the acceptability – indeed necessity – of transgenic 
crops. Scoones (2006) makes a similar argument in the context of India where ‘the 
rhetoric of moving from a ‘Green Revolution’ to a ‘Gene Revolution’, or the ushering 
in of a biotech-led ‘Second Green Revolution’ conjures up a strong sense of 
continuity with the heroic success of the 1960s and 70s’ (p.27-28).  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
We have traced Norman Borlaug’s pathway into the realm of public agronomy 
through a number of distinct phases: working wheat breeder; promoter of a particular 
approach to wheat breeding; promoter of the Mexican wheat varieties in Latin 
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America and subsequently Asia; promoter of the Green Revolution more generally; 
brand hero of the Green Revolution; and finally, appropriated celebrity. 
This evolution was fuelled by a deep personal commitment to ending hunger. 
He framed this commitment in terms of the spectre of hunger, mass starvation and 
what he referred to as the ‘Population Monster’ (Borlaug 1971b, Borlaug et al. 1969). 
This framing supported a compelling crisis narrative: for Borlaug, the only way to 
confront this ‘onrushing (threatening) future’ (de Wilde 2000, Jansen & Gupta 2009) 
was through focused research and the intensive use of agricultural technology to 
maximise crop yield. Borlaug’s single-minded dedication to this task necessitated a 
stripped-down, simplified worldview in which there was no place for any 
consideration of trade-offs, winners and losers, social and political relations, or the 
CGIAR’s transgressions into non-core research areas such as natural resource 
management, participation, gender and systems research. Similarly, alternative 
analyses and criticism were neither helpful nor welcomed, and Borlaug used his 
growing recognition within the agriculture, science and policy communities to close 
down consideration of other views and methods. What could ‘butterfly chasing’ 
academics, environmentalists or bureaucrats possibly know about the realities of 
hunger fighting (see Hesser 2006, p.166)?  In his view their misplaced concerns only 
delayed the delivery of desperately needed new technologies to farmers, and thus 
prolonged the hunger and misery of millions. 
Borlaug was without doubt a central actor in the events that enabled the 
dramatic increases in wheat and rice productivity and production during the 1960s and 
1970s. His contributions were widely recognised and celebrated and his name became 
synonymous with the Green Revolution brand of agricultural development. For nearly 
four decades he used his professional credibility and enhanced public profile to 
promote Green Revolution, which he argued was the only viable way to fight hunger 
effectively. Without Borlaug (or someone playing a similar role), interest in the Green 
Revolution brand may have been more difficult to sustain, and more space might have 
opened up for debate about alternative approaches and methods.  
One important dynamic which began in earnest with the award of the 1970 
Nobel Peace Prize, and continues today, is rooted in the way that Borlaug’s life and 
career are portrayed. The biographies (Bickel 1974, Hesser 2006, Swanson 2009, 
Vietmeyer 2009a, Vietmeyer 2009b, Vietmeyer 2009c) and hundreds of obituaries 
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tend toward hero worship: by-and-large they offer little in the way of analysis or 
insight. This is particularly disappointing in relation to Borlaug’s involvement in the 
SG2000 initiative where the lack of critical analysis allows an unbroken chain to be 
constructed between the achievements with wheat and rice in the 1960s and 1970s and 
the promise of a new Green Revolution in Africa.  
As brand hero for the Green Revolution Borlaug helped create and sustain 
what has become a dominant narrative about the future of agriculture. As always, one 
aspect of promoting one’s brand is trashing the alternatives. Borlaug was an active 
critic of approaches such as organic farming, put forward by some as alternatives to 
the Green Revolution. It is fair to say that his high profile, singular focus and 
forthright speech helped to limit and polarise these debates. Similarly, in aligning 
himself with the agro-chemical and biotechnology industries in his later years, 
Borlaug added his voice to those seeking to stifle alternative narratives about the 
future of agricultural development and close down consideration of alternative 
pathways.  
Finally, it is interesting to reflect on the fact that to date no brand heroes have 
emerged for the alternative approaches to agricultural development. Why is there no 
Norman Borlaug equivalent for organic farming or any of the other ‘agro-ecological’ 
approaches? To be sure there are some very articulate and high-profile promoters – 
Tewolde B. G. Egziabher, Miguel Altieri, Jules Pretty and Norman Uphoff to name a 
few – but none of these individuals can lay claim to either the public profile or the 
kind of intimate involvement in the development of the brand as Borlaug could 
through his wheat breeding. The very nature of these agroecological approaches, 
including their complexity and context specificity, is in stark contrast to the broad 
environmental adaptation of the semi-dwarf wheat varieties that resulted from 
Borlaug’s innovative ‘shuttle breeding’. This complexity and context specificity may 
well mitigate against the emergence of brand heroes. Closely related to the question of 
context specificity is the fact that despite a proliferation of ‘success stories’, to date 
none of these alternative approaches have yielded the kind of spectacular results seen 
with the early Green Revolution. In any case, the lack of one or more brand heroes for 
these approaches puts their advocates at a significant disadvantage in both contested 
policy processes and more popular arenas. 
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Notes 
1 Later, Borlaug and Dowswell (1995) recognised some of the limitations of this 
view. 
2 On 23 May 2011 a Google search of the string [Borlaug ‘the man who saved a 
billion’] resulted in 11,900 hits. 
3 Borlaug was a primary signatory of the ‘Declaration in Support of Protecting Nature 
with High-yield Farming and Forestry’ 
(http://www.highyieldconservation.org/declaration.html) which was spearheaded by 
the Center for Global Food Issues (CGHI), a project of the Hudson Institute which is 
think tank supported by the agricultural chemical industry 
(http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Hudson_Institute). 
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